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Abstract 
SDG-HAZOP method was introduced into safety evaluation of emulsion explosives production line for the first time in order to conduct 
safety evaluation of emulsion explosives production process more effectively and to reduce accidents, Firstly, hazard factors in a typical 
production line of emulsion explosives were identified after analyzing the whole process. Then the key variables and relationship 
equations were listed based on evaluation unit division. SDG-HAZOP qualitative model was developed, by which automatic reasoning 
and analysis was conducted. The result could express almost all dangerous factors and adverse consequence, and can reveal the path of 
danger propagation. Finally, a safety evaluation system for emulsion explosives factories was built, which is practically significant to 
guide safety production.  
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Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
Emulsion explosives were introduced into china at the end of 1970s. It has gradually replaced power AN explosives as a 
new type of the anti-water industrial explosives. It is playing a more and more important role because of its higher safety 
compared with other explosives[1]. However, accidents in emulsion explosives production line occurred sometimes during 
the past ten years, which resulted in enormous casualty and property loss. Therefore, it is significant to do further research 
on the identification of risk factors in emulsion explosives production process. 
With the complex processing conditions and many risk factors in production of emulsion explosives, it is very important 
to choose a suitable safety evaluation method. Presently, the main methods of safety evaluation mainly include safety 
checklist method, fault tree analysis, LEC risk assessment and system safety analysis, etc. But there exist some problems for 
evaluation methods mentioned above, such as lack of computer application, relying on experience as well as lack of 
systemic study[2]. Therefore, to explore a new kind of evaluation method is a trend of safety evaluation of emulsion 
explosives production and some related studies have been conducted. Recently, SDG (Signed Directed Graph) based 
HAZOP method being widely used in petrol-chemical industry has shown a good result[3-4]. In this paper, SDG-HAZOP 
will be introduced into safety evaluation of emulsion explosives production line.  
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2. SDG-HAZOP 
2.1. Brief introduction of SDG-HAZOP  
SDG model is composed of several nodes and branches. It is a kind of qualitative model, which could include the 
potential information of the system on a large scale[5]. Fig.1 is an example of the simplest SDG model. Node A and Node B 
denote variables in the system. The directed branch denotes the relationship between the nodes. Sgn(A-B) denotes influence 
direction between the nodes. The combination of the three forms an SDG model. It could describe a process equipment unit 
or the entire process. By utilizing reasoning mechanisms, all the possible fault propagation paths in the model can be 
automatically found, and all the possible abnormal causes or adverse consequences can be determined[6]. Moreover, 
starting from a node, both forward and backward reasoning is available. 
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic process hazard analysis method, by which all the 
possible abnormal causes and the adverse consequences of a deviation could be identified. Since both SDG and HAZOP 
could realize bi-directional reasoning, SDG is one of the most effective methods to complete HAZOP automatically. A 
HAZOP analysis process by forward and backward reasoning of SDG is defined as SDG-HAZOP method[7]. It is especially 
suitable for the process industry and other systems described by key variables. 
2.2. Modelling processes of SDG-HAZOP 
Main modeling processes of SDG-HAZOP are as follows: (1) division of unit. (2) identification of key variables, which 
are regarded as the nodes in SDG model. (3) determination of influence equation of each unit. (4) identification of all the 
possible abnormal causes and the adverse consequences of each unit. (5) establishment of SDG-HAZOP model for each unit. 
(6) Establishment of SDG-HAZOP model for the system. The flowchart of the process is shown in Fig. 2. 
3. SDG-HAZOP model of emulsion explosives production 
3.1. Production process of emulsion explosives 
A typical production process of emulsion explosives is shown in Fig.3. The process is briefly described as follows: The 
water phase, solution containing AN and other oxidizing salts is heated in a dissolving tank to 105-115  and stored in a 
storage tank. Then it is added into the fuel phase containing wax, oil and emulsifier at 95-105  to be premix in a vessel at 
low speed stirring. Then it is pumped to final emulsification where a stable emulsion matrix is formed. After cooling (about 
50 ) and sensitization a certain density of emulsion explosives are finally obtained. 
 
Fig. 1. Simple SDG model. 
 
Fig. 2. Flow chart of modelling SDG-HAZOP. 
 
Fig. 3. Flow chart of emulsion explosives production. 
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3.2. Hazard analysis and unit division  
The manufacturing emulsion explosives include preparation of oxidizer solution phase, preparation of fuel phase, pre-
emulsification, pumping, final emulsification, sensitization and cartridging. So the process can be divided into 6 units, in 
which pre-emulsification, pumping and final emulsification are considered to be relatively dangerous because of high-speed 
shearing, closed circumstance and high temperature. 
3.3. Establishment of unit model 
As shown in Fig.4, pre-emulsification unit is one of the most important units includes a static mixer, a premix device, a 
steam inlet valve, a cooling water valve and a temperature sensor. The modeling processes according to the steps of section 
2.2 are as follow.  
3.3.1. Influence relationship determination 
Many variables are involved in emulsion explosives production process, such as temperature, pressure, liquid level, flow, 
etc. As the accidents statistics shown, it is easy to happen burning explosion accidents in the premix device under the 
conditions of high temperature, high impurity content, idling and zero flow of cooling water. Variables associated with these 
may directly lead to an accident. Therefore, the key variables were selected as follows: temperature of premix device (TY), 
impurity content of input (QYI), effect of premix (EY). In addition, in the model, there are flow rate of input (FYI), flow 
rate of output (FYQ), temperature of input (TYI), bubble content of premix (QQY) and non-matching extent of flow rate 
between input and output (EIO) as correlation variables as well as stirring speed (SY), valve of cooling water (WDN15), 
valve of steam (GDN15) and stirring time as machine variables. 
3.3.2. Influence relationship 
There exists a complicate influence relationship among the variables of emulsion explosives production process. For 
example, the temperature of premix device increases with the decrease of cooling water flow rate, while decreases with 
temperature and stirring speed. The relationship can be depicted by interaction equations clearly. The arrow represents the 
effect direction. The positive sign indicates a positive effect. The negative sign indicates a negative effect. The positive sign 
and negative sign with (ct) behind mean a conditional effect. The interaction equations of pre-emulsification are given in 
Table 1. 
3.3.3. Abnormal reasons and adverse consequences 
Since SDG-HAZOP model of pre-emulsification unit was built on the basis of interaction between variables such as 
temperature, pressure and flow rate, the abnormal causes can be determined by the cause of variables deviation above. 
Electric spark and mechanical failure were not considered in this model although they are common risk factors in pre-
emulsification unit. According to the references and the experience of experts, nodes of causes and consequences were 
added into SDG-HAZOP model. Some important causes and consequences of pre-emulsification are listed in Table 2. 
static mixer
DN15DN15
steam inlet
valve
cooling water valve
premix device
  
Fig. 4. Flow chart of pre-emulsification. 
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Table 1. Interaction equations of pre-emulsification 
variable interaction equation 
EY EY +(ct)FYI-(ct)FYI+(ct)TYI-(ct)TYI+(ct)SY-(ct)SY+(ct)KY-(ct)KY 
TY TY QQY+TYI-FYQ+QYI+EIO 
QQY QQY +SY 
FYQ FYQ +FYI 
EIO EIO +FYI-FYQ 
Table 2. Causes and consequences of pre-emulsification 
variable abnormal reason adverse consequence 
Reason for high deviation Reason for low deviation consequence of high 
deviation 
consequence of high 
deviation 
EY    disqualification of 
products 
TY friction of components or over temperature 
protection 
 explosion  
FYQ  blockage of outlet   
SY control device failure or setting too high control device failure or lower 
artificial setting 
  
KY control device failure control device failure   
                              
 
3.3.4. SDG-HAZOP model of pre-emulsification unit  
After adding key variables as the backbone nodes and connecting all nodes by directed branches according to the 
relationship between them, SDG-HAZOP model of pre-emulsification unit was established as shown in Fig.5. The solid line 
represents a positive effect, the dashed represents a negative effect and the line with double vertical represents a conditional 
effect. Rectangle represents the abnormal reason (R) or adverse consequence (C). 
 
Fig. 5. SDG-HAZOP model of pre-emulsification. 
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Fig. 6. SDG-HAZOP model of emulsion explosives production. 
 
Fig. 7. The route of dangerous scenarios caused by variation of TY. 
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Table 3. Abnormal causes resulting in higher variation of TY 
Abnormal cause fault propagation path 
oxidizer mixed-in oil phase, high stirring speed, overheated bearings, high melting temperature TOR(+)->TOC(+)->TYI(+)->TY(+) 
flammable impurities mixed-in water phase, high stirring speed, overheated bearings, TWR(+)->TWC(+)->TYI(+)->TY(+) 
blockage of outlet FYQ(-)->EIO(+)(: high non-matching extent)->TY(+)
Blocked filter, broken filter core EWR(-)->QWO(+)->QYI(+)->TY(+) 
stuck discharge valve of storage tank  FWCO(-)->FYI(-)->FYQ(-)(:flow drying-up)-> TY(+)
Table 4. Adverse consequences caused by higher variation of TY 
Adverse consequence fault propagation path Adverse consequence 
Explosion TY(+) Explosion 
Disqualification of products TY(+)(:extremely high temperature)->EY(-) Disqualification of products 
(a)     (b)  
(c)     (d)  
Fig. 8. Safety evaluation system for emulsion explosives factories. 
3.4. SDG-HAZOP model of emulsion explosives production 
Similarly, SDG-HAZOP models of preparation of oxidizer solution phase, preparation of fuel phase, pre-emulsification, 
pumping, final emulsification, sensitization and cartridging were established. Finally, the entire SDG-HAZOP model of 
emulsion explosives production shown in Fig.6 was built by assembling all the unit models. 
3.5. Results and analyses of SDG-HAZOP 
If the temperature of premix device (TY) increases, HAZOP analysis should be conducted by set TY as the deviation 
point. All abnormal causes and adverse consequences can be determined by exploring fault propagation paths in the SDG-
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HAZOP model, as the deep color shown in Fig7 by deeper color. Some abnormal causes and adverse consequences of 
higher TY are listed in Table 3 and Table 4. 
After reasoning by computer, 11 kinds of abnormal causes and 2 kinds of adverse consequence related with an extra-high 
TY were obtained automatically. That is to say, there exist 22 fault propagation paths in the model when TY higher than 
normal value. Compared with the data of emulsion explosives production site, the result shows that SDG-HAZOP method is 
more efficient and accurate than present evaluation methods. 
4.  Safety evaluation system for emulsion explosives factories 
After investigation and theoretical analysis, a safety evaluation system for emulsion explosives factories was 
programmed by visualization program Visual Basic 6.0 and Microsoft Access 2007. This system includes risk factors 
identification module, risk factors analysis module accident cases database and faults inquiry and safety measures module. 
Besides, the latest SDG-HAZOP safety evaluation method was introduced to the system as another main module. The start 
interface of system is shown in Fig.8(a). 
 (1)Hazard factors identification module include information of all dangerous materials and risk factors related during 
production of emulsion explosives, as shown in Fig.8(b).  
 (2)Risk factors analysis module includes fault tree analysis (FTA) and HAZOP analysis. This part is shown in Fig.8(c). 
The result of FTA for each unit reveals all the causes of accident and relationship among them intuitively. The result of 
HAZOP analysis provides basic data for SDG-HAZOP. 
 (3)Accident cases and faults inquiry module make it available for technical personnel to query at any time. 
 (4)Safety measures module recommends some safety measures according to the real conditions of factories in order to 
eliminate hidden dangers.  
 (5)As the key part of the system, SDG-HAZOP gives fault propagation paths with graphics interface, which could 
provide a visual guide for factories. This part is shown in Fig.8 (d). 
 The safety condition of emulsion explosives factories can be obtained simply and conveniently by using this system. Its 
application results could provide a convenient and visual guide for factories. 
5. Conclusions 
SDG-HAZOP method is introduced into safety evaluation of emulsion explosives production line in this paper for the 
first time. Based on a typical emulsion explosives production line, hazard factors were identified after analyzing the whole 
process and unit division. Then SDG-HAZOP qualitative model was developed after analyzing the key variables, 
relationship equations, cause and consequence. Then automatic reasoning and analysis were conducted. Compared with the 
data of emulsion explosives production site and the experience of experts, it proved that SDG-HAZOP method is an 
efficient method to express almost all dangerous factors and negative consequence, and could reveal the path of danger 
propagation. Finally, a safety evaluation system for emulsion explosives factories was built on the base of SDG-HAZOP 
result. It is practically significant to guide safety production. 
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